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WHEN THE ENDS DO NOT JUSTIFY THE 
MEANS: THE APPLICATION OF 
STATISTICAL SAMPLING TO DETERMINE 
LIABILITY IN FALSE CLAIMS ACT CASES 
CHRISTINA VLAHOS† 
INTRODUCTION 
The False Claims Act serves as the primary tool for the 
federal government’s recovery of funds that were fraudulently 
disbursed under national security and defense contracts, 
entitlement programs, federally insured loans and mortgages, 
transportation and research grants, and agricultural supports.1  
In 2013, the Department of Justice recovered $3.8 billion under 
the False Claims Act,2 and in 2014, that number soared to almost 
$6 billion.3 
For the last five years, the federal government has recovered 
$2 billion a year under health care fraud claims alone.4  These 
cases originate when health care companies submit false claims 
to the federal government for reimbursement under such 
programs as Medicare, Medicaid, and TRICARE.5  Defendants 
include major corporations like Johnson & Johnson, Omnicare, 
	
† Notes & Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2017, St. 
John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2014, Columbia College (Columbia 
University). 
1 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department 
Recovers Nearly $6 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2014 (Nov. 
20, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-nearly-6-
billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2014. 
2 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department 
Recovers $3.8 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2013 (Dec. 20, 
2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-38-billion-false-
claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2013. 
3 Department of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, supra note 1. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
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and Community Health Systems, Inc.6  For example, in 
September of 2015, KMART Corp. was compelled to pay $1.4 
million to the federal government when it unlawfully 
incentivized Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries to fill their 
prescriptions at KMART pharmacies.7 
Along with enabling the federal government to recover 
billions of dollars from major corporations and government 
contractors, the False Claims Act has enabled the federal 
government to prosecute individuals like Farid Fata, a 
hematologist-oncologist who administered chemotherapy and 
cancer treatments to hundreds of healthy patients whom he 
intentionally misdiagnosed.8  Not only did he administer those 
treatments to perfectly healthy individuals, but he also had those 
patients undergo many more sessions of treatment than even a 
cancer-afflicted patient would need.9  His intention was to submit 
claims for those treatments for reimbursement from government 
programs.10 
The False Claims Act is clearly a useful and important tool 
for the federal government to recover funds that were, 
essentially, wrongfully disbursed to meritless claimants.  The 
Justice Department should enforce the False Claims Act even 
more extensively against companies and individuals like Dr. Fata 
	
6 Id. Johnson & Johnson paid $1.1 billion in a settlement over False Claims Act 
allegations regarding several of its prescription drugs. Id. Omnicare also settled for 
$116 million, as a result of its violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute, which falls 
under the broader umbrella of the False Claims Act. Id. Community Health Systems 
is “the nation’s largest operator of acute care hospitals,” and the company was 
required to pay $98.15 million for claims submitted for unnecessary inpatient 
treatments that should have been provided at lower cost elsewhere. Id. 
7 KMART Corp. Pays $1.4 Million To Resolve False Claims Act Allegations in 
Connection with Drug Manufacturer Coupons, Gas Discounts, BUFF. REFLEX (Sept. 
3, 2015, 10:30 AM), http://buffaloreflex.com/news/kmart-corp-pays-million-to-resolve-
false-claims-act-allegations/article_710d9f34-511b-11e5-812b-df823731a52f.html. 
8 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Detroit Area Doctor 
Sentenced to 45 Years in Prison for Providing Medically Unnecessary Chemotherapy 
to Patients (July 10, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/detroit-area-doctor-
sentenced-45-years-prison-providing-medically-unnecessary-chemotherapy. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. Following Fata’s sentencing, Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. 
Caldwell explained, “Time and again, Dr. Fata callously violated his patients’ trust 
as he used false cancer diagnoses and unwarranted and dangerous treatments as 
tools to steal millions of dollars from Medicare, even stooping to profit from the last 
days of some patients’ lives.” Id. Fata engaged in such practices “to increase his 
billings to Medicare . . . . [He] then submitted fraudulent claims to Medicare . . . for 
these unnecessary treatments.” Id. 
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who engage in unlawful practices in the interest of accumulating 
more wealth at the expense of the federal government and 
American taxpayers.  Citizens would be better protected from 
further exploitation, both monetary—as their tax dollars are first 
spent on false claims, then further expended by the government 
through its attempts to recover those stolen tax dollars, thereby 
multiplying the adverse effect by diverting those funds from 
other uses—and personal, like Dr. Fata’s patients, whose 
collective health was exploited for his gain. 
Several courts have recently made it easier to successfully 
bring claims under the False Claims Act.  In cases where 
defendants have allegedly submitted thousands of false claims to 
the federal government for reimbursement, rather than 
presenting proof of each claim’s falsity, as is typically required,11 
a court in the Eastern District of Tennessee recently permitted, 
instead, the submission of a sampling of claims.12  Based on the 
analysis of liability in that sample, that court extrapolated 
liability to the remainder of the alleged false claims.13 
While the federal government has a compelling interest in 
recovering as much of those fraudulently disbursed funds as 
possible, especially in cases where the defendants are acting with 
such ignoble intent as Dr. Fata, the federal government’s 
recovery should not come at the price of the defendants’ Due 
Process rights under the Fifth Amendment.  By permitting 
statistical sampling to determine liability, the courts lower the 
burden of proof for liability in False Claims Act cases, essentially 
bypassing pleading requirements and finding fraud without 
granting the defendants an opportunity to defend themselves. 
Thus, this Note argues that the use of statistical sampling to 
determine liability in False Claims Act cases constitutes a 
violation of a defendant’s constitutional right to Due Process 
under the Fifth Amendment.  Part I of this Note provides some 
historical context for the False Claims Act and discusses its 
contemporary application as a tool for the federal government to 
recover funds that were disbursed to fraudulent claimants.  Part 
	
11 Roger S. Goldman et al., Fourth Circuit May Address Use of Statistical 
Sampling in False Claims Act Actions, LATHAM & WATKINS: CLIENT ALERT 1 (July 
21, 2015), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/lw-statistical-sampling-false-
claims-act. 
12 United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., Nos. 1:08-cv-251, 
1:12-cv-64, 2014 WL 4816006, at *19 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 29, 2014). 
13 Id. 
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II examines earlier False Claims Act cases in which statistical 
sampling was assessed as a tool for evidentiary analysis.  It also 
examines a recent False Claims Act trial in which the presiding 
judge held that extrapolation for a statistical sample was 
sufficient to prove liability, notwithstanding many years of 
precedent holding otherwise.  Part III argues that, on balance, 
even though the federal government has a strong interest in 
enforcing the False Claims Act and recovering government funds, 
statistical sampling fails to provide adequate procedural due 
process to defendants.  This methodology deprives defendants of 
their Seventh Amendment rights, fails to adhere to civil 
litigation pleading requirements, and defies accepted standards 
of proof for liability. 
I. FALSE CLAIMS ACT IN CONTEXT 
A. History of the False Claims Act 
Since its initial passage in 1863 in the wake of the Civil War, 
the False Claims Act continues to be among the most effective 
enforcement tools employed by the federal government to combat 
the fraudulent taking of public funds.14  The Unions spent vast 
amounts of money to sustain its army’s efforts against the 
Confederacy, and a substantial portion of the population enlisted 
in the armed forces.15  But, as Representative Fortney Stark 
explained during his remarks on the Congressional Record in 
1985 regarding amendments to the False Claims Act, 
opportunists “appeared who sold shoddy, dangerous, or worthless 
merchandise.  There were military men who extorted contractors 
or took kickbacks and gratuities from contractors, and politicians 
who participated in . . . uncontrolled spending.”16 
In consequence of such exploitation—which included, among 
many other fraudulently and poorly executed contracts, the sale 
of blind and diseased mules that were “unfit for the service, and 
almost worthless” to the federal government, rather than 
artillery horses and cavalry horses—the False Claims Act was 
	
14 Frank LaSalle, Comment, The Civil False Claims Act: The Need for a 
Heightened Burden of Proof as a Prerequisite for Forfeiture, 28 AKRON L. REV. 497, 
497 (1995). 
15 131 CONG. REC. 1,636-01 (1985) (statement of Rep. Stark). 
16 Id. 
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conceived.17  The 37th Congress appointed a special committee to 
“inquire into all the facts and circumstances connected with 
contracts and agreements by or with the [g]overnment growing 
out of its operations in suppressing the rebellion.”18  The statute, 
which provided that “any person who knowingly submitted false 
claims to the government was liable for double the government’s 
damages plus a penalty of $2,000 for each false claim,”19 saved 
the federal government millions of dollars after its enactment.20 
B. Initiating False Claims Act Litigation 
A False Claims Act case may be initiated in several different 
ways: the Attorney General may file suit in district court; 
attorneys working on behalf of the country’s nearly one hundred 
U.S. Attorney’s Offices may file suit; alternatively, as stated 
above, a “private person[]” may file his own suit on behalf of the 
federal government, in what is called a qui tam action.21  This 
private person, who is called a “relator,” may act on any 
incentive, even just for personal gain.22  Still, the result is that 




19 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: A PRIMER (2011), www.justice.gov/ 
sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/04/22/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf. 
20 131 CONG. REC. 1,636-01 (1985) (statement of Rep. Stark). The False Claims 
Act has continued to serve as a useful tool for the federal government: 
[The False Claims Act] is intended to protect the treasury against the 
hungry and unscrupulous host that encompasses it on every side, and 
should be construed accordingly. It was passed upon the theory . . . that one 
of the least expensive and most effective means of preventing frauds on the 
treasury is to make the perpetrators of them liable to actions by private 
persons acting . . . under the strong stimulus of personal ill will or the hope 
of gain. Prosecutions conducted by such means compare with the ordinary 
methods as the enterprising privateer does to the slow-going public vessel. 
James B. Helmer, Jr., False Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrity for 150 Years for 
Rogues, Privateers, Parasites and Patriots, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1261, 1267 (2013) 
(alteration in original). 
21 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 19; Helmer, supra note 20, at 1267 (citing 
United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. Or. 1885)). 
22 The qui tam relator may receive up to twenty-five percent of the damages 
awarded at the end of a False Claims Act suit. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2012). Qui 
tam actions are initiated when nongovernment agents bring claims on behalf of the 
government. By initiating this action, the qui tam “relator” is generally able to share 
in the Government’s recovery. Qui tam comes from qui tam pro domino rege quam 
pro si ipso in hac parte sequitur, meaning “[w]ho sues on behalf of the king as well as 
for himself.” Helmer, supra note 20, at 1262 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1251 
(6th ed. 1990)). 
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funds, which would not otherwise have been recovered, are 
recovered.  This has allowed perpetrators of fraud against the 
government to be found and brought to trial in ways that are 
otherwise impossible considering the Justice Department’s 
limited capital and human resources. 
C. Contemporary Amendments to the False Claims Act 
Since its initial passage, the False Claims Act has been 
amended a number of times.23  The federal government now 
collects treble damages at trial, rather than just double 
damages.24 
Additionally, certain steps have been taken to expedite 
plaintiffs’ efforts in bringing False Claims Act cases.  For 
instance, one amendment that was made to the False Claims Act 
was the modification of the defendant’s requisite state of mind—
it was reduced from a “knowing” to a “recklessness” standard.25  
Another amendment that has facilitated recovery through the 
False Claims Act is the reduction of the standard for the burden 
of proof.  In 1986, Congress adopted the preponderance of 
evidence standard, replacing the clear and convincing evidence 
standard.26  Consequently, plaintiffs are more likely to achieve 
success in bringing a False Claims Act case now than they were 
previously.27 
The features of this law, from the qui tam provisions 
allowing nongovernment actors to bring cases on behalf of the 
government, to the modification of the proof standard, are 
indicative of a commitment on behalf of Congress to enable the 
federal government to recover as much money as it can when the 
government has been wrongfully deceived into paying fraudulent 
claims. 
D. Elements of a False Claims Act Cause of Action 
Though the False Claims Act is applied to a wide variety of 
fraudulently submitted claims to the federal government, 
whether it is a health care fraud claim or fraudulent  
 
	
23 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 19. 
24 Id. 
25 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012). 
26 LaSalle, supra note 14, at 500–01. 
27 Id. at 501. 
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disbursements under a military contract, the following are the 
“requisite elements” that plaintiffs must prove when any False 
Claims Act case proceeds to trial: 
(1) a [defendant] presents, or causes to be presented, a claim for 
payment or approval; (2) the claim is false or fraudulent; and 
(3) the [defendant’s] acts are undertaken “knowingly,” i.e., with 
actual knowledge of the information, or with deliberate 
ignorance or reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the 
claim.28 
To prove the falsity of the information, the plaintiff must 
establish that the claim “involves an incorrect description of 
goods or services provided or a request for reimbursement for 
goods or services never provided.”29  However, False Claims Act 
cases rarely go to trial.30 
Moving forward towards litigation, given the publicity and 
potential damages that may accompany a trial, is unfavorable for 
defendants,31 but the pleading and proof standards imposed at 
trial are also fairly difficult for plaintiffs to satisfy.  To determine 
whether claims submitted to the federal government by 
defendants are fraudulent, either the government or plaintiff-
relators must prove liability for each individual false claim 
asserted.  For instance, in United States ex rel. Bunk v. Gosselin 
World Wide Moving, N.V., the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit, deciding a False Claims Act case, “[treated] 
each of the 9,136 claims as a discrete basis for liability.”32  One 
can imagine the time and resources that would be required to 
	
28 United States v. Robinson, No. 13-cv-27-GFVT, 2015 WL 1479396, at *4 (E.D. 
Ky. Mar. 31, 2015) (quoting United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 
501 F.3d 493, 503 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also United States v. Villaspring Health Care 
Ctr., Inc., No. 3:11-43-DCR, 2011 WL 6337455, at *4–5 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 19, 2011). 
29 United States v. Fadul, No. DKC 11-0385, 2013 WL 781614, at *7 (D. Md. 
Feb. 28, 2013) (quoting Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 697 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
30 It is worth noting that when False Claims Act cases actually proceed to trial, 
the federal government is able to recover more money than it would at settlement, 
as treble damages are accounted for in the final judgment, whereas they are not 
accounted for generally at settlements. See 2014 Year–End False Claims Act Update, 
GIBSON DUNN 5, 11 (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/ 
documents/2014-Year-End-False-Claims-Act-Update.pdf. Moreover, an unfavorable 
verdict for defendants in a False Claims Act case can result in such punitive 
measures as the cancellation of government contracts with those companies, 
institutions, or individuals who failed to comply with the statute. Id. at 11. 
31 See id. (regarding repercussions of False Claims Act verdicts for defendants). 
32 See United States ex rel. Bunk v. Gosselin World Wide Moving, N.V., 741 F.3d 
390, 401 (4th Cir. 2013). 
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effectively review each of the 9,136 claims to determine whether 
each element of a False Claims Act cause of action is satisfied.  It 
would require so much time, and so many resources, in fact, that 
some courts have begun to reconsider the evidentiary mandate 
imposed on plaintiffs in such False Claims Act cases.  An 
alternative means of determining liability, which purports to 
save both time and resources, is statistical sampling. 
II. SAMPLING IN FALSE CLAIMS ACT CASES 
“Sampling is a technique which selects a representative 
portion . . . of the relevant universe of items and, using the 
results obtained in this sample, makes inferences about unknown 
quantities of interest in the relevant universe.”33  Statistical 
sampling has already proven to be a useful tool in class action 
cases, mass tort cases, and other areas of mass litigation.34  
Sampling allows parties to a trial to avoid the “fishing 
expeditions” and exorbitant costs of discovery in cases where 
there are thousands of claims.35  Still, the use of statistical 
sampling as a means of determining liability in False Claims Act 
cases would dramatically “change . . . the landscape of litigating 
and defending False Claims Act cases.”36  The use of statistical 
sampling would, controversially, permit plaintiffs in False 
Claims Act cases to circumvent standard procedure, and instead 
of presenting the “claim-by-claim proof typically required in 
highly fact-dependent civil cases,”37 plaintiffs could simply 
present either an arbitrarily selected or, worse still, intentionally 
selected, nonrepresentative cross section of claims and, based on 
the information extracted from a sample, find that the defendant 
is liable for the aggregated claims. 
	
33 Expert Report on Data Processing, Sample Selection and Proposed 
Estimation Methodology of Constantin T. Yiannoutsos, Ph.D. at 2, United States v. 
Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., No. 112CV00064, 2014 WL 7778494 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 
21, 2014). 
34 Charles Yablon & Nick Landsman-Roos, Discovery About Discovery: Sampling 
Practice and the Resolution of Discovery Disputes in an Age of Ever-Increasing 
Information, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 719, 722–23 (2012). Sampling was even 
“expressly” approved as a discovery procedure for e-discovery disputes in the 2006 
revisions to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(B). Id. 
35 Id. at 725–26. 
36 Chris Haney, Extrapolating False Claims: The Debate in U.S. v. Life Care, 
LAW360 (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/579373/extrapolating-false-
claims-the-debate-in-us-v-life-care. 
37 Goldman, supra note 11. 
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A. False Claims Act Cases in Which Statistical Sampling Was 
Rejected 
It appears that courts resolving False Claims Act cases have 
generally been unreceptive to parties who proffer statistics 
rather than hard, concrete evidence.38  Rendering a judgment of 
liability on the basis of probabilities and projections, rather than 
undergoing a claim-by-claim examination at trial, is still an 
uncommon practice in most courthouses and one with which 
judges seem to be uncomfortable.39 
Traditionally, even in cases where there are thousands of 
false claims, courts have rejected statistical sampling if it is 
possible to examine each claim individually to determine its 
falsity.40  For instance, in United States v. Friedman, where the 
defendant had his patients unnecessarily hospitalized in order to 
file reimbursable claims with Medicare, the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts rejected the 
government’s attempt to employ random sampling of more than 
fifty percent of the defendant’s alleged 676 violations of the False 
Claims Act.41  The sample had been subjected to review, and was 
found to support medical documentation produced by the 
defendant and the relevant hospitals.42  However, the presiding 
judge declined to consider that statistical evidence.43  The final 
judgment rested on the findings that forty-two separate claims 
were indeed violations of the False Claims Act, and the court 
	
38 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Crews v. NCS Healthcare of Ill., Inc., 460 F.3d 
853, 856 (7th Cir. 2006); see also United States ex rel. El-Amin v. George Wash. 
Univ., 533 F. Supp. 2d 12, 31 n.9 (D.D.C. 2008). 
39 Judge Mazzone explained his rationale for rejecting the opportunity to 
extrapolate liability based on a sample: 
While I recognize the validity of the mathematical and statistical 
projections based on a review of a smaller number of claims I have declined 
to extrapolate in the manner urged by the government. My declination is 
based on the existence at trial of discrete claims which were analyzed and 
discussed and subjected to cross examination. I was able therefore to 
review each claim in reaching my conclusions. While I am mindful of the 
government's efforts to shorten the trial and present its evidence efficiently 
and clearly, I am reluctant to accept a statistical sampling as the basis for 
doubling the alleged overpayment without the same scrutiny and support. 
United States v. Friedman, No. 86-0610-MA, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21496, at *9 n.1 
(D. Mass. July 23, 1993). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at *2, *9 n.1, *16–17. 
42 Id. at *6–8. 
43 Id. at *5–9 n.1. 
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arrived at this finding because each claim was “analyzed and 
discussed and subjected to cross examination” at trial.44  
However, the court declined the opportunity to extrapolate that 
finding of liability to the remaining claims; so long as the 
individual analysis of each claim was not impossible or utterly 
impracticable, the judge was reluctant to extrapolate a certain 
amount of liability based on the results of that statistical 
analysis.45 
The reticence on the part of judges to render judgments on 
the basis of sampling is clearly perceptible in the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit case, United States ex 
rel. Crews.46  In Crews, the relator brought a qui tam complaint 
against a pharmacy where she was previously employed, 
subsequent to the employees of that pharmacy pleading guilty to 
offenses under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.47  The relator 
alleged that the pharmacy, which resold medications after 
patients returned their unfinished prescriptions, submitted false 
claims by reselling medication, which had already been paid for 
once, to people who were covered by Medicaid.48  However, 
instead of presenting evidence of individual instances where 
medications that were paid for once by Medicaid were returned 
and resold, and paid for again by Medicaid, the relator presented 
“basic math.”49  Her claim was that: 
[The pharmacy] provided prescription medication to nursing 
home residents, 60% of whom were on Medicaid.  Furthermore, 
10% to 20% of the dispensed medications were returned unused 
by the patients.  Therefore . . . “basic math prove[d] that 6% to 
12% of recycled drugs would have been [re]distributed to 
Medicaid recipients [and thus rebilled . . . ].”50 
The relator’s failure to provide actual proof of false claims—
that is, her failure to identify individual claims that were 
definitively falsely filed, and instead speculating, and presenting 
calculated probabilities—resulted in summary judgment for the 
defendant.51 
	
44 Id. at *9 n.1. 
45 Id. 
46 460 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2006). 
47 Id. at 855. 
48 Id. at 856. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 858. 
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Similarly, in United States ex rel. El-Amin v. George 
Washington University,52 the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia responded to a motion in limine by rejecting 
the submission of claims of which relators did not have “personal 
knowledge.”53  The relators claimed that the George Washington 
University hospital received “thousands, if not millions, of 
[federal] dollars” as reimbursement for anesthesia treatments, 
which the hospital claimed were conducted by anesthesiologists, 
though they were actually conducted by CRNAs or residents, 
which would have been considerably less expensive for patients 
covered by Medicare.54  Demonstrating their disinclination to 
determine liability on the basis of percentages and 
extrapolations, rather than firsthand information and concrete, 
reviewable evidence, the court instead required the claimants to 
plead each claim individually,55 or at least, to “identify the exact 
Medicare claims that were allegedly false.”56  Moreover, for each 
claim, the relators were instructed to provide “the date the claim 
was filed with Medicare, the name of the attending 
anesthesiologist, the type of the medical procedure involved and 
the amount of the claim.”57  The court demanded this specificity 
of fact because the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants 
engaged in a regular practice of submitting false claims for 
reimbursement of procedures that were only conducted by 
CRNAs.  However, there was doubt as to the uniformity of this 
practice and as to the circumstances surrounding the submission 
of each of those claims for reimbursement.58  Principally, the 
claims were insufficiently similar and so could not be analyzed in 
the aggregate and, instead, required individualized inquiries.59  
The relators’ failure to provide the requested information hardly 
strengthened their assertion that there were thousands of falsely 
submitted Medicare claims.60 
 
	
52 533 F. Supp. 2d 12 (D.D.C. 2008). 
53 Id. at 31. 
54 Id. at 18. 
55 Id. at 31 n.9. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 31. 
59 Id. at 30. 
60 Id. at 31 n.9. 
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Judges have also felt that the potential for error in statistical 
analysis is another consideration that precludes them from 
allowing statistical data to be submitted as proof of fraudulent 
activity by the defendants.  This was the case in United States ex 
rel. Trim v. McKean.61  There, the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Oklahoma did not allow the use of a 
statistical sample as evidence of false claims; in particular, the 
court did not accept extrapolation from that data sample as 
evidence of false claims.62  The sample was deemed too small in 
size, and the claims were not sufficiently uniform.63  The claims 
included in the sample were neither “consistent” nor 
“predictable,” and therefore were “not a reliable or accurate 
representation of all [the] claims.”64  When the sample is not 
comprised of relatively uniform claims, showing uniform patterns 
and uniform claim amounts, the claims are necessarily not 
subject to the fact-specific analysis they ought to be undergoing.  
Furthermore, the likelihood that the outcome of the statistical 
analysis will be accurate is quite low.65 
Finally, in the District of Columbia District Court case, 
United States ex rel. Hockett v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare 
Corp.,66 the relators had ample opportunity to examine each 
individual claim.  Consequently, their presentation of statistical 
sampling as an alternative to examining each claim individually 
was rejected.67  Thus, the court would not accept inferences by 
the relators that there were certain patterns of behavior that the 
defendant engaged in, thereby violating the False Claims Act.68  
Instead, the court mandated the production of “real evidence to 
support [each] contention.”69  The relators had access to the 
relevant records for each false claim that they alleged.70  It was 
	
61 31 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (W.D. Okla. 1998). 




66 498 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2007). 
67 Id. at 65–66. 
68 Id. at 66. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 65 (“Relator has had access to the records of the 66 patients at issue. No 
attempt has been made to review each of those records to determine if impropriety 
can be gleaned from them. Likewise, there has been no concerted effort, through 
discovery aimed at records keepers or caregivers, to pin down the who, what, and 
when of the alleged false claims.”). 
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certainly feasible for the relators to review these records, and the 
discovery of the “who, what, and when of the alleged false 
claims,” was no insurmountable feat.71  The relators’ failure to 
specifically plead each false claim, when that evidence was 
readily available to them, resulted in the court’s rejection of 
statistical sampling in that case.72 
These cases demonstrate that judges are typically guided by 
the public’s interest in both ensuring accurate outcomes and 
protecting defendants’ procedural due process rights.  Courts 
have been unwilling to permit statistical sampling so long as the 
claims are concrete and information is sufficiently accessible, 
such that individual review of each claim is feasible.  
Additionally, where there has been reason to believe that the 
results of the statistical sampling would not be representative of 
the population of claims sampled, or they would otherwise be 
inaccurate, courts have rejected the use of statistical sampling. 
B. Defining the Parameters of Statistical Sampling’s Limited 
Application Prior to 2014 
Despite courts’ wariness of statistical sampling, there are 
indeed limited circumstances in which courts have allowed the 
use of statistical sampling during False Claims Act litigations.  
One line of precedent demonstrates courts’ willingness to permit 
sampling for the determination of damages.73  Another line of 
cases demonstrates that, in very limited circumstances and 
within a closed universe of specific facts, there may be mitigating 
factors that enable a court to permit statistical sampling, while 
avoiding the possibility of depriving defendants of their due 
process rights.  Subsequent courts have chosen not to broaden 
the scope of such usage of statistical sampling, or have otherwise 
found that those rulings were very fact specific and 
circumstantial, and therefore not more broadly applicable. 
	
71 Id. at 65. 
72 Id. at 66, 70. The relator failed to “point to a single specific false claim or a 
sufficiently detailed description of one.” Id. at 71 (quoting United States ex rel. 
Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physicians Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 997 (9th Cir. 2002)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
73 See False Claims Act—Proof of Liability—Eastern District of Tennessee Rules 
that Statistical Extrapolation May Suffice to Prove Liability, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2074, 
2078 (2015) [hereinafter False Claims Act—Proof of Liability]. 
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1. Statistical Sampling for the Determination of Damages 
The use of statistical sampling to measure damages in False 
Claims Act cases is a “long-standing” practice, and “relatively 
uncontroversial”—it is not challenged on due process grounds.74  
In United States v. Cabrera-Diaz,75 the United States District 
Court for the District of Puerto Rico allowed a sample, which had 
been selected by the government for an audit of the defendant’s 
claims for reimbursement for anesthesia services he provided, to 
be used to determine just how many of the submitted claims were 
false.76  The results of this audit, which examined the operating 
reports, anesthesia records, and nurse notes relating to the 
claims included in the sample,77 were then extrapolated to the 
entire quantity of claims submitted by the defendant to 
determine an estimate of the amount overpaid to the defendant 
by Medicare.78  These findings were used to determine the 
measure of damages to be awarded to the government.79  The 
court, in line with earlier holdings, held that statistical sampling 
was acceptable when its function was limited to the 
determination of damages.80 
Similarly, in United States v. Rogan,81 the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that statistical sampling was acceptable to determine 
the measure of damages where the manager of a healthcare 
company was engaged in a kickback scheme—patients were 
referred to a particular medical center and kickbacks were 
disbursed.82  There were 1,812 claims in question; the defendant 
argued that “the district judge had to address each of the 1,812 
claim forms,” to prove that there were patients who did indeed 
receive treatment at the medical center that qualified for 
	
74 Jeanne A. Markey & Raymond M. Sarola, 4th Circ. FCA Statistical Sampling 
Case Is One To Watch, LAW360 (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/ 
712001/4th-circ-fca-statistical-sampling-case-is-one-to-watch. 
75 106 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D.P.R. 2000). 
76 Id. at 237, 242. 
77 Id. at 240. 
78 Id. at 237. 
79 Id. at 242. 
80 Id. at 240 (“Numerous cases involving Medicaid and Medicare overpayments 
have endorsed proof of damages through the use of statistics and statistical 
sampling . . . . [T]he Ninth and Second Circuits rejected plaintiffs’ due process 
challenges to the use of statistical extrapolation from a sample to calculate the 
amount of Medicaid overpayments.”). 
81 517 F.3d 449 (7th Cir. 2008). 
82 Id. at 451–52. 
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reimbursement.83  But this argument was rejected as “a formula 
for paralysis,” by the Seventh Circuit, which held instead that 
“[s]tatistical analysis should suffice.”84  Statistical analysis was 
sufficient for the determination of damages because it was nearly 
impossible to find information regarding each individual claim to 
clearly prove that each one was fraudulently submitted.85 
The use of statistical sampling and extrapolation was again 
approved to determine damages in a 2013 District of Maryland 
case, United States v. Fadul.86  There, the defendant was a doctor 
who had allegedly submitted false claims for reimbursement by 
Medicare, essentially “double dipping”87 and receiving payments 
for more procedures than were rendered.  The government 
supplied an analysis of statistically valid random samples and 
found that the procedure in question for which reimbursement 
was sought, retroperitoneal ultrasounds,  were not medically 
necessary, if they were even performed at all.88  Ultimately, the 
court found that the use of sampling was allowable because the 
relevant medical records for all 551 claims alleged were difficult 
to obtain,89 and because the extrapolation method was “the 
soundest measure of damages.”90 
Courts have long distinguished the evidentiary standards for 
liability from the evidentiary standards for damages.  In fact, the 
United States Supreme Court reinforced this principle in Story 
	
83 Id. at 453 (“Nor does Rogan get any mileage from the argument that 
Edgewater’s records do not ‘rule out’ the possibility that the four physicians provided 
some medical services.”). 
84 Id. at 453. At trial, in the Northern District of Illinois, the court had treated 
each claim as an individual basis for determining the monetary penalty: 
Each knowing submission of a false or fraudulent claim is a separate 
violation of the False Claims Act. Thus, the number of violations of the 
False Claims Act depends on the number of false or fraudulent claims or 
other requests for payments that defendant caused to be submitted. A 
penalty is assessed per false claim. 
United States v. Rogan, 459 F. Supp. 2d 692, 720 (N.D. Ill. 2006), aff’d, 517 F.3d 449 
(7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit determined that it was unimportant that the patients may have received 
medical care meriting reimbursement, and instead accepted a statistical analysis—
“the entire amount that [the defendant] received on these 1,812 claims must be paid 
back.” Rogan, 517 F.3d at 453. 
85 Id. 
86 No. DKC 11-0385, 2013 WL 781614 (D. Md. Feb. 28, 2013). 
87 Id. at *2. 
88 Id. at *3. 
89 Id. at *14. 
90 Id. 
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Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,91 holding: 
“[T]here is a clear distinction between the measure of proof 
necessary to establish the fact that petitioner had sustained some 
damage, and the measure of proof necessary to enable the jury to 
fix the amount.”92  When parties have reached the stage in the 
trial where they are debating damages, the defendant has 
already been deemed culpable, following the court’s stringent 
review of the alleged claims.  Because the defendant has already 
been found culpable, the defendant must accept the consequences 
of its actions, including the consequence that the court will 
determine the damages based on statistical analyses and 
approximations.93  It is acceptable for the defendant to suffer the 
negative consequences of the application of statistical sampling 
to the determination of damages because the defendant has been 
found liable.94  This same reasoning clearly cannot be applied to a 
defendant at any earlier stage in the proceeding; the court should 
not modify or weaken the procedures that are in place during any 
stage at trial where the defendant has not yet been found liable. 
2. Statistical Sampling’s Application upon Waiver of 
Defendant’s Procedural Due Process Rights 
Though statistical sampling is generally proposed by the 
plaintiffs—at the objection of defendants—who hope to complete 
their evidentiary analysis more efficiently, there are occasions 
when sampling has been accepted by the defendants.  In such 
instances, the defendant’s express consent to sampling preempts 
any concerns regarding procedural due process, as they waive 
their right to more stringent review. 
For instance, in 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit conceded in United States v. Chen that the use 
of statistical sampling to determine liability in a False Claims 
Act case involving a healthcare provider was allowable when the 
defendant submitted that the sampling was representative of all 
claims.95  The jury found the defendant liable for submitting 
3,544 false claims to Medicare for reimbursement, although only 
37 claims had been reviewed in depth as part of the federal 
	
91 282 U.S. 555 (1931). 
92 Id. at 562. 
93 False Claims Act—Proof of Liability, supra note 73, at 2078. 
94 Id. at 2079. 
95 402 F. App’x 185, 188 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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government’s investigation.96  The Ninth Circuit held that the 
review of only 37 claims in a case involving over 3,000 claims was 
allowable because the defendant himself conceded that each of 
the 3,544 claims were filed under similar circumstances and 
conformed to a certain pattern.97  By effectively granting 
permission to complete a statistical analysis rather than 
individual analyses, the defendant waives the procedural 
requirement of determining liability on an individual basis for 
each claim. 
Another instance in which sampling was permitted with the 
permission of both parties is United States v. Krizek,98 in the 
District Court for the District of Columbia.  There, the defendant 
billed more than twenty-four hours in a day and submitted those 
billings for reimbursement by the federal government.99  Upon 
the agreement of both parties, the court reviewed a sampling of 
only 200 claims, rather than examining all 8,002 reimbursement 
claims alleged.100  “The fact that there was some liability was a 
foregone conclusion, and the nature of the case meant that ‘[a] 
determination of liability on the issue of improper coding would 
be equally applicable to all other claims.’ ”101  The parties’ mutual 
decision to forego analysis of each individual claim led to the use 
of a sampling technique. 
In most cases, where the court harbored concern that the 
individual claims were too fact specific for sampling, sampling 
was rejected altogether.  However, the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana was able to find an 
acceptable compromise in In re Vioxx Products Liability 
Litigation.102  A “Special Master” completed a report in which he 
evaluated all 30,000 claims, and completed an individual 
valuation for each unique claim.  For the claims that bore 
overwhelmingly similar characteristics, the court allowed the 
	
96 Id. at 188–89. 
97 Id. 
98 192 F.3d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
99 Id. at 1025. 
100 United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 940–41 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
101 United States ex rel. Hockett v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 498 F. 
Supp. 2d 25, 66 (D.D.C. 2007) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Krizek, 859 F. Supp. 5, at *7 (D.D.C. 1994)). 
102 See generally 239 F.R.D. 450 (E.D. La. 2006 Nov. 21, 2006); see also Paul 
Trapani, In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation: Circumventing Due Process 
Concerns by Allowing Individualization in Sampling Procedures, 82 TUL. L. REV. 
2517, 2518 (2008). 
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claimant to present an analysis of a statistical sample as 
evidence, rather than examining each of the claims separately.103  
For the remaining claims, the “Special Master” performed 
individualized fact-specific analyses.104  In so doing, the court was 
able to “lessen[] the burden of discovery upon the parties,” 
without “circumventing a party’s burden of proof.”105 
When defendants effectively waive their rights to individual 
trials of law and fact on each of the claims alleged against them, 
the court is justified in skipping procedural steps that may 
otherwise be required for the sake of due process.106  Consent to 
particular methods of sampling further allows the plaintiffs and 
the court to utilize procedures and tools that would otherwise be 
unavailable to them.107 
3. The Use of Statistical Sampling to Overcome a Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
The use of statistical sampling has also been accepted at 
earlier stages of trial, before the time arises for a final 
determination of liability on the part of the defendants.  
Sampling has been judged an adequate source of evidence to 
overcome the hurdle of defeating a motion for summary 
judgment. 
For example, in the recent Eastern District of Kentucky case, 
United States v. Robinson,108 the court determined that the 
information extracted from a statistical sample was sufficient to 
overcome the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.109  The 
defendant in that case argued that the plaintiff’s use of an 
expert, who examined a sample of thirty claims out of 25,000 
alleged claims, was “an insufficient method to prove the ‘falsity’ 
of any individual claim in this case,”110 but the court ignored this 
argument, holding that the statistical analysis performed by the 
	
103 Trapani, supra note 102, at 2523. 
104 Id. at 2527. 
105 Id. at 2529. 
106 Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a 
World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561, 622 (1993). 
107 Id. at 623. 
108 No. 13-cv-27-GFVT, 2015 WL 1479396 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2015). 
109 Id. at *11. “For purposes of summary judgment, however, the United States 
as the non-moving party only needs to ‘set forth specific facts showing there is a 
genuine issue for trial.’ ” Id. at *6 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)). 
110 Id. 
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plaintiff’s expert was sufficient to present a “genuine issue of a 
material fact,” for the purpose of defeating a motion for summary 
judgment.111  The court wrote that even though the plaintiff’s 
expert “may not have proved definitively that each of the over 
25,000 claims at issue were unreasonable or unnecessary, such 
proof is unnecessary at this stage of litigation.”112  Therefore, 
statistical sampling appears to have been deemed acceptable at 
the summary judgment stage of a proceeding, because it 
establishes a genuine issue of material fact that merits 
consideration at trial.  Nonetheless, this opinion provides no 
indication as to whether statistical sampling would be accepted 
as evidence for the trial stage of a case.  The court did not 
respond to the defendant’s argument regarding the burden of 
proving each individual claim’s falsity. 
The use of statistical sampling has thus been permitted, 
albeit in very limited circumstances, with great caution.  Courts 
have demonstrated neither a readiness to allow plaintiffs to 
effectively skip several steps in the proof-gathering process at 
trial, nor a willingness to sacrifice diligence and fact-specific 
analysis for the sake of efficiency. 
4. Breaking Ranks with Precedent—U.S. ex rel. Martin v. Life 
Care Centers of America, Inc.113 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Tennessee recently departed from the strong precedent rejecting 
the use of statistical sampling to determine liability in False 
Claims Act cases.114  In that case, United States ex rel. Martin v. 
Life Care Centers of America, Inc., the court considered the 
admissibility of expert testimony promoting the use of statistical 
sampling to determine liability in a False Claims Act case 
involving Life Care Centers’ submission of false claims for 
reimbursement by Medicare and TRICARE.115 
 
	
111 Id. at *6. 
112 Id. 
113 Nos. 1:08-cv-251, 1:12-cv-64, 2014 WL 4816006 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 29, 2014). 
114 See supra text accompanying notes 38–39, for discussion of False Claims Act 
cases in which statistical sampling was rejected. 
115 Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 2014 WL 4816006, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 29, 
2014). 
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In United States ex rel Martin v. Life Care, the court was 
presented with 154,621 claims under the False Claims Act.116  
The government hired an expert witness, Dr. Constantin 
Yiannoutsos, a professor of Biostatistics at the Indiana 
University Department of Medicine.117  Dr. Yiannoutsos was 
contracted to provide his expert statistical analysis; using a 
three-step process, he arrived at an estimation of the number of 
alleged claims, which were, in fact, for noncovered services—that 
is, falsely filed claims which were reimbursed by the federal 
government—and an estimation of the loss the government 
incurred as a result of those claims.118 
First, at the government’s prompting, Dr. Yiannoutsos 
selected a sample of claims—400 out of the alleged 154,621.119  
Next, he conducted “a medical review of the records related to the 
claims contained in the sample admissions.”120  Finally, he 
scrutinized the results of his analysis and arrived at an estimate 
of the total number of claims that were actually falsely filed.121  
The results of this statistical analysis were offered by the 
plaintiffs as evidence in support of their charge that the 
defendants violated the False Claims Act. 
The defendants, Life Care Centers of America, Inc., 
challenged the admissibility of Dr. Yiannoutsos’s report for a 
number of reasons.  Stefan Boedeker, the expert for the 
defendants, asserted that Dr. Yiannoutsos’s methodology would 
“ultimately yield an arbitrary, non-representative, and invalid 
selection of facilities that will be part of the sampling universe 
while the rest of the facilities will be ignored.”122  Despite 
Boedeker’s claims that Dr. Yiannoutsos’s methodology was 
“flawed,” primarily with regards to the selection of his sample,123 
though also with regards to the particular form of statistical 
	
116 Id. at *5. 
117 Id. at *4. 
118 Id. at *6. 
119 Id. at *5–6. 
120 Id. at *6. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at *8 (citing Expert Report by Stefan Boedeker of Stefan Boedeker, 
United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., No. 1:08-CV-
00251, 2014 WL 4816006 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 14, 2013) (2013 WL 12066076) 
[hereinafter Expert Report of Boedeker]. 
123 Id. at *9. 
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analysis Dr. Yiannoutsos applied,124 the Eastern District of 
Tennessee still held that Dr. Yiannoutsos’s testimony was 
admissible.125 
To arrive at this finding, the court applied the Daubert 
test.126  In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,127 the 
United States Supreme Court held that under the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, a trial judge is charged with the responsibility of 
“ensuring that” expert testimony “both rests on a reliable 
foundation” and “is relevant to the task at hand.”128  Further, the 
Court stated that “[p]ertinent evidence based on scientifically 
valid principles will satisfy those demands.”129  The following 
factors must be satisfied before expert testimony may be deemed 
worthy of admission: 
[(]1) whether the expert’s scientific technique or theory can be, 
or has been, tested; [(]2) whether the technique or theory has 
been subject to peer review and publication; [(]3) the known or 
potential rate of error of the technique or theory when applied; 
[(]4) the existence and maintenance of standards and controls; 
and [(]5) whether the technique or theory has been generally 
accepted in the scientific community.130 
While these factors are essential to the court’s determination of 
the acceptability of the proffered scientific evidence, the Supreme 
	
124 Id. at *12. Boedeker claimed that a “probe sample” would have been a 
preferable alternative to Dr. Yiannoutsos’s stratification technique and use of 
simulations. Id. Boedeker explained in his Expert Report: 
In statistical sampling applications involving very complex populations in 
which there is insufficient knowledge about the variation in the underlying 
data, it is absolutely necessary to perform a pilot or probe sample. A pilot 
or probe sample is a statistically valid random sample on a smaller scale 
which is then used to assess the variation in the population and to 
calculate the sample size necessary to achieve a desired (or required) level 
of confidence and precision such that the extrapolations to the entire 
universe will be accurate and reliable. 
Expert Report of Boedeker, supra note 122. 
125 Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 2014 WL 4816006, at *19. 
126 Id. at *10. In Daubert, the Supreme Court adjudicated a case in which two 
minors brought suit against Merrell Dow, claiming they suffered limb reduction 
birth defects because their mothers had taken Bendectin, a drug prescribed for 
morning sickness to about 17.5 million pregnant women in the US between 1957–
1982. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579 (1993). 
127 509 U.S. 579. 
128 Id. at 597. 
129 Id. 
130 Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 2014 WL 4816006, at *2 (citing United States v. 
Beverly, 369 F.3d 516, 528 (6th Cir. 2004)). 
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Court also iterated in the Daubert opinion that the procedure and 
methodology must be the focus of such determination, not “the 
conclusions that they generate.”131  Moreover, the party who 
introduces this expert testimony in support of their position 
bears the burden of proving that these criteria have been met.132  
Applying this test, the Eastern District of Tennessee concluded 
that Dr. Yiannoutsos’s testimony sufficiently satisfied the 
pertinent standards.133  Consequently, the court held that the 
Government’s proffered expert testimony—in particular, Dr. 
Yiannoutsos’s statistical sampling, analysis, and extrapolation 
was an acceptable basis for determining liability in a False 
Claims Act case. 
As such, the Eastern District of Tennessee rejected the 
defendants’ arguments that statistical sampling was 
inappropriate in the context of False Claims Act cases, including 
their assertions that: (1) the False Claims Act requires “proof of a 
false claim for payment,” and “individualized proof as to every 
claim”; (2) that the United States must demonstrate that the 
defendant had the “knowledge with respect to the details of each 
individual claim”; (3) extrapolation is an inappropriate 
methodology to measure the falsity of claims allegedly submitted 
to the government; and (4) sampling and extrapolation “violate” 
the defendant’s “due process rights under the Fifth 
Amendment.”134 
The Eastern District of Tennessee in supporting its holding 
stated:  “Courts have approved of the use of statistical sampling 
and extrapolation where an individualized claim-by-claim-review 
of the elements in a case would be unfeasible or extremely costly 
	
131 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. 
132 Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 2014 WL 4816006, at *2. 
133 Id. at *1. The federal government presented the following arguments in 
support of Dr. Yiannoutsos’s testimony, as applied to the Daubert standards: 
[T]he Government’s use of sampling is limited to the number of claims for 
non-covered services and the loss associated with those claims; 
(2) Defendant’s arguments about representativeness are unsupported by 
statistics, law or logic; (3) a probe sample is not necessary to develop a 
statistically valid sample; (4) any arguments about issues with the medical 
review should be directed at the medical review rather than the sample 
design; and (5) Dr. Yiannoutsos’[s] testimony is supported by well-accepted 
statistical methods. 
Id. at *13. 
134 Brief for United States at 1, United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Centers 
of America, Inc., No. 1:08-CV-00251, 2014 WL 4816006 2014 WL 5359287 (E.D. 
Tenn. Mar. 21, 2014). 
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and where the challenging party is afforded an opportunity to 
rebut the results.”135  The court held that the defendants’ due 
process rights were satisfied because they had the opportunity to 
cross examine the plaintiff’s expert statistician, and offer 
competing evidence.136 
In making this ultimate conclusion, the Eastern District of 
Tennessee has opened doors for False Claims Act plaintiffs which 
were otherwise closed—it has expanded the scope of acceptable 
usage of statistical sampling, without much consideration of the 
extensive precedent holding otherwise, in such a way that could 
dramatically affect the future of False Claims Act litigation.137 
5. United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior Community, 
Inc.138—Undoing What Life Care Undid 
A year after the decision in Life Care, the District of South 
Carolina, in United States ex rel. Michaels v. Agape Senior 
Community Inc., also considered, but rejected, the use of 
statistical sampling to determine liability in False Claims Act 
cases.  In this case, which was a qui tam, and where the claims 
alleged were “fact-dependent and wholly unrelated to each and 
every other claim,”139 the parties on both sides agreed to a 
bellwether analysis.140  This is a specific form of statistical 
sampling whereby a sample of cases “large enough to yield 
reliable results is tried to a jury.”141  The federal government 
ultimately rejected this methodology, despite the parties’ mutual 
agreement to use statistical sampling, claiming that the results 
were inaccurate, with an “error rate” of 20–60%.142 
The court acknowledged the obvious difficulty of 
demonstrating liability for each individual claim, considering the 
sheer volume of claims; and it recognized that quite often, as in 
United States ex rel. Michaels, the plaintiffs must hire experts 
	
135 Id. at 6. The defendants took the opportunity to rebut this evidence at trial 
by contesting the method and accuracy of the statistical analysis. They were not able 
to contest the apparent falseness of each individual alleged false claim. 
136 Markey & Sarola, supra note 74. 
137 False Claims Act—Proof of Liability, supra note 73. 
138 No. 0:12-3466-JFA, 2015 WL 3903675 (D. S.C. June 25, 2015). 
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who review each individual claim.143  In United States ex rel. 
Michaels, it was necessary for the plaintiff-relators to pay $400 
an hour for file review to experts who spent 4 to 9 hours 
reviewing each individual claim, in a case where over fifty 
thousand false claims were alleged.144  The expense of such an 
exercise is likely a disincentive for plaintiffs who would otherwise 
pursue their cases all the way through to trial.  However, the 
District of South Carolina’s ultimate ruling, even after 
considering and citing the decision in Life Care, was that these 
claims are intrinsically fact specific, and as a result, these cases 
are simply not “suited for statistical sampling.”145  The court also 
highlighted the fact that the evidence necessary to prove liability 
for each individual claim, the patients’ medical charts, was 
“intact and available for review by either party.”146  The 
government’s interest in ensuring an accurate and fair outcome 
was so strong in this case that it superseded any interest in 
expediting the procedural process whereby liability was 
determined—so much so that the government decided to 
intervene in a qui tam case to rectify the bad outcome brought 
about by statistical sampling. 
The conflicting outcomes of these cases underscore the 
struggle of balancing the interests of the federal government in 
facilitating recovery of fraudulently disbursed funds under the 
False Claims Act and the public’s interest in preserving 
defendants’ due process rights. 
III. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS APPLIED TO 
STATISTICAL SAMPLING 
Most scholarship regarding the acceptability of sampling as 
a tool for adjudication of mass litigations diverges based upon 
two analytical theories.  Some argue that sampling allows for the 
efficient adjudication of these large cases, where courts are faced 
with the enormous task of adjudicating claims numbering in the 





143 Id. at *1. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at *8. 
146 Id. at *7. 
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sampling, though it may “maximize utility,” obstructs justice by 
bypassing the procedural safeguards necessary for the protection 
of defendants’ right to Due Process.147 
Representing the former school of thought, in his article 
regarding the use of sampling in class action litigation, Hillel 
Bavli argues that sampling is an acceptable method to determine 
liability so long as the outcome of the sampling is accurate.148  So 
long as the ends are just, Bavli argues, the means by which those 
ends are achieved—that is, statistical sampling—will be 
acceptable, despite the misgivings expressed by judges, in a 
number of cases, who rejected statistical sampling in the interest 
of protecting defendants’ due process rights.149 
Defending the latter school of thought, and employing a 
rights-based, rather than utility-based, understanding of mass 
litigation, Robert Bone argues in Statistical Adjudication that a 
“rights-based theory assumes that the purpose of adjudication 
is,” also, “to determine each party’s legal rights accurately.”150  
The proponents of this theory assert that sampling is a flawed 
methodology, which does not guarantee accurate results, and so 
it should not be accepted as an appropriate alternative for 
evidentiary analysis in mass litigations.151 
While each of these theories justifies or refutes statistical 
sampling based on the perceived accuracy or inaccuracy of the 
outcomes derived from statistical analysis,152 the apparent 
accuracy or inaccuracy of the outcome should not overshadow or 
discount the importance of the means by which those outcomes 
are achieved.  The methodology that allows the court to arrive at 
a particular result must conform to constitutional requirements, 
and should it fail to meet those requirements, then that 
methodology should be retooled or replaced. 
Courts risk arbitrarily depriving defendants of their property 
when they use statistical sampling to determine liability in False 
Claims Act cases, and so statistical sampling affords defendants 
insufficient process under the Mathews v. Eldridge test and 
	
147 Bone, supra note 106, at 594. 
148 Hillel J. Bavli, Aggregating for Accuracy: A Closer Look at Sampling and 
Accuracy in Class Action Litigation, 14 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 1, 3 (2015). 
149 Id. at 2–3. 
150 Bone, supra note 106, at 598. 
151 Id. 
152 See Vern R. Walker, Restoring the Individual Plaintiff to Tort Law by 
Rejecting “Junk Logic” About Specific Causation, 56 ALA. L. REV. 381, 390 (2004). 
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should not be used to determine liability.153  There are several 
factors that must be considered to determine whether the 
modification of procedures in a trial—for instance, the adoption 
of statistical sampling rather than proving individual liability for 
each claim154—deprives defendants of their right to due process.  
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the United States Supreme Court listed 
several criteria for making this determination.155  First, the Court 
considers “the private interest that will be affected” by the 
procedure; second, it examines “the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation” through the procedures under attack and the 
“probable value” of additional or alternative safeguards; and 
third, principal attention is given to the interest of the party 
seeking the procedure, with, nonetheless, due regard for any 
ancillary interest the government may have in providing the 
procedure or forgoing the added burden of providing greater 
protection.156 
A. Defendants Have Substantial Property Interests That Are at 
Stake in False Claims Act Litigations 
First, the private interest that is affected by the use of 
statistical sampling is easily discernible in False Claims Act 
cases.  There is an obvious property interest at stake:  The money 
that may be recovered from the defendants, which may number 
in the hundreds of millions of dollars,157 and the False Claims Act 
also permits the government to collect treble damages.158  There 
may even be a liberty interest at stake159—a ruling against the 
defendant may result in not only reputational harm to the 
	
153 See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
154 Christopher J. Roche, Note, A Litigation Association Model To Aggregate 
Mass Tort Claims for Adjudication, 91 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1507 (2005). 
155 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
156 Id. 
157 Record Year for False Claims Act Recoveries, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD 
EDUC. FUND, http://www.taf.org/press-releases/record-year-false-claims-act-
recoveries (last visited Jan. 12, 2017). 
158 LaSalle, supra note 14, at 522. 
159 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). The “stigma” plus test is derived 
from Paul v. Davis. Reputation alone is not a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest. Id. Instead, there needs to be some right or status, which was previously 
recognized by state law, that was altered or extinguished—for example, loss of 
employment opportunities. Id. In the context of False Claims Act cases, the impact 
to the company’s reputation following a finding of fraud, together with the rescission 
of government contracts, or the future inability to contract with the government, 
may be sufficient to establish a liberty interest. 
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company, but the defendants may also lose the “ability to 
contract with the government.”160  These are substantial interests 
and merit substantial procedural safeguards so that defendants 
may not be arbitrarily deprived of these interests. 
B. Statistical Sampling Increases the Risk of Erroneous 
Deprivation of Defendant’s Property 
Second, with statistical sampling, the risk of erroneous 
deprivation of property is great.  Statistical sampling is not 
necessarily a reliable or accurate means of determining whether 
each of the alleged claims satisfies the requisite elements of the 
False Claims Act cause of action.  The factors that courts 
generally consider when measuring the risk of erroneous 
deprivation include the accuracy, fairness, and reliability of the 
outcomes of the procedure.161  By allowing plaintiffs to present a 
statistical analysis of a sample, rather than undergoing 
evidentiary analysis of each alleged claim, the courts essentially 
lower the standard of proof for False Claims Act cases, and, 
consequently, heighten the risk of erroneous deprivation.162 
1. Methodological Flaws of Statistical Sampling 
Statistical sampling has been enthusiastically approved as a 
prospective alternative to individualized assessments of each 
claim asserted in other types of mass litigation.163  However, so 
	
160 LaSalle, supra note 14, at 521, 523–24 (“There is a significant possibility that 
a contractor or health care provider will lose its ability to contract with the 
government if a False Claims Suit is successfully brought. Particularly in the health 
care field, the most substantial threat of any investigation is the possibility of 
exclusion—‘the death penalty for health care providers.’ ”). 
161 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343. 
162 See Kirby D. Behre & A. Jeff Ifrah, Statisticians at DOJ May Overstate Case, 
21 NAT’L L. 22, 22 (1999). 
163 Mass litigation involves “numerous similar claims,” which “[number] in the 
tens of thousands.” Some common examples of mass litigations include mass torts, 
product defects, antitrust conspiracy, securities fraud, and more. David Rosenberg, 
New Approaches for a Safer and Healthier Society: A Sampling-Based System of 
Civil Liability, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 635, 638 (2014). The use of statistical 
sampling has long been promulgated within the context of mass tort litigations 
because the encumbrance of litigating each claim individually, and offering adequate 
evidence for each claim, is so great that plaintiffs are often “preclude[ed]” from 
“trying cases.” Roche, supra note 154, at 1502. Indeed, in the context of such mass 
litigations, courts are now far more accepting of statistical sampling than perhaps 
ever before: Statistical sampling is “a well-accepted alternative for the trial judge 
facing crippling discovery and evidentiary costs.” Id. (citing In re Simon II Litig., 211 
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long as there is doubt as to the reliability and validity of its 
results, in the context of the False Claims Act, it is not a just 
alternative.  This methodology is inherently flawed in a number 
of ways.  There is little uniformity in the application of statistical 
sampling; experts disagree about which methodology to use, the 
means by which a sample is selected, the size of the sample, and 
whether it is even appropriate to use sampling as a means to 
“cut-off discovery or merely [to] shift costs.”164 
First, there are various techniques for statistical sampling, 
and statisticians disagree as to which techniques are most 
effective, as well as the problems each technique presents.165  
Moreover, statisticians recognize that their own analyses may 
bring about inaccurate results.  For instance, in the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts case 
United States ex rel. Loughren v. UnumProvident Corp.,166 the 
court rejected sampling for the determination of liability.167  The 
plaintiffs presented the testimony of their expert witness, who 
elected to use cohort sampling, as opposed to random sampling or 
stratified sampling, which are more familiar to most lawyers and 
judges.168  Upon presenting the results of his initial analysis, the 
plaintiff’s expert was heavily criticized by the defendant’s expert, 
so much so that the plaintiff actually accounted for the 
	
F.R.D. 86, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated, remanded on other grounds, 407 F.3d 125 
(2d Cir. 2005)). 
164 Yablon & Landsman-Roos, supra note 34, at 724. “The Federal Rules provide 
no guidance on any of these matters and the discussion of these issues in the cases 
themselves is limited.” Id. at 723. 
165 Random sampling is most commonly used, but its results are unreliable 
unless the population from which the sample is drawn is homogeneous. On the other 
hand, while stratified sampling accounts for the differences in characteristics 
possessed by individual claims in the entire population, the stratifications are not 
guaranteed to create uniform bodies of claims. Moreover, the “confidence interval” 
for stratified sampling is lower. JOSEPH L. GASTWIRTH, STATISTICAL SCIENCE IN THE 
COURTROOM 410 (2000). 
166 604 F. Supp. 2d 259 (D. Mass. 2009). 
167 Id. at 269. 
168 Id. at 261; see also Yale Department of Statistics, Sampling, http://www.stat. 
yale.edu/Courses/1997-98/101/sample.htm (“Simple random sampling is the basic 
sampling technique where we select a group of subjects (a sample) for study from a 
larger group (a population). Each individual is chosen entirely by chance and each 
member of the population has an equal chance of being included in the sample. 
Every possible sample of a given size has the same chance of selection.”). 
Id. Stratified random sampling, on the other hand, is “generally used when the 
population is heterogeneous, or dissimilar, where certain homogeneous, or similar, 
sub-populations can be isolated (strata).” Id. 
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defendant’s expert’s criticism and incorporated his suggestions 
into his analysis.169  Ultimately, the court held that the results of 
the plaintiff’s expert were flawed, as a result of his flawed 
method of statistical analysis.170  Because the plaintiff was 
unable to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
its expert’s testimony was reliable, the court determined that 
extrapolating liability from its expert’s sample was 
inappropriate.171 
Second, if any elements of a claim are unaccounted for in the 
sample, the outcome of a statistical analysis is not likely to be 
accurate.172  Ultimately, a finding of liability in a False Claims 
Act case requires the plaintiff to prove that the claims were both 
fraudulent and that the defendant has the requisite intent—facts 
proving these elements are not captured in a statistical 
sample.173 
In his article regarding individualized determinations of 
liability in mass tort cases, Vern Walker argues that the 
classification of claims for the purpose of defining a sample is a 
major source of error in statistical analysis.  The extrapolation of 
data from a statistical analysis of a sample, or group, that is 
incorrectly classified, and the eventual drawing of inferences 
from an initial faulty premise, “may result in erroneous 
conclusions about groups of individuals.”174 
	
169 Loughren, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 263. 
170 Id. at 269. 
171 Id. 
172 Peter Simon, Pros and Cons of Statistical Sampling, LAW360 (Mar. 22, 2011), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/232125/pros-and-cons-of-statistical-sampling (“In a 
construction case involving defective windows installed in a new housing 
development, the plaintiff hired an expert who identified all the windows that 
readily showed signs of defect, and examined a random sample of these windows. 
The expert then extrapolated his results to all windows, not just those with signs of 
defect. This was inappropriate, because the sample included only the windows that 
were known to (very likely) be defective. Extrapolation to the entire population 
overstated the true rate of defect among windows.”). 
173 GASTWIRTH, supra note 165. 
174 Walker, supra note 152; see also Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, 
Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the 
Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 837 (1992) (“The more heterogeneous the 
subgroups, the greater the error involved. Either the subgroups need to be composed 
of sufficiently similar cases to insure reduction rather than magnification of error, or 
the plaintiffs would have to waive their right to more accurate determinations.”). In 
their article defending statistical sampling’s application in mass tort cases, Saks and 
Blanck argued that statistical sampling produces both reliable and valid results 
when the following criteria are satisfied: (1) the cases in the population are identical, 
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Third, as Judge Richard Posner explained in An Economic 
Approach to the Law of Evidence, the use of statistical sampling 
to determine liability at trial may be problematic because jurors 
could misunderstand the math and its application to the facts.175  
Judge Posner cited the work of Ronald Allen, who argued that: 
[T]he standard burden of proof instruction to a jury in a civil 
case . . . will often imply that the jury should find in favor of the 
plaintiff even if the probability that his claim is valid is much 
less than .5. The jury will be instructed to render a verdict for 
the plaintiff if it is satisfied that he has proved each of the 
elements of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence even if 
the elements are independent that is, their probabilities are 
uncorrelated. It is as if the court were telling the jury, that as 
soon as it finds one element proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence, it should assume that that element has been proved to 
a certainty. In other words, the jurors are being told to be bad 
mathematicians!176 
The results of an analysis of a nonrepresentative sample may be 
mistakenly interpreted by the jury as proof of all elements of the 
claim.  This failure to sufficiently review evidence supporting 
each element of the claim—that is, falsity and intent and the 
actual submission of false claims for reimbursement—could very 
well result in a ruling against the defendants, and the erroneous 
deprivation of their property. 
Finally, in cases where parties have challenged the sample 
size that is selected for analysis, it is generally required that the 
parties “retain an expert statistician to explain, both at the 
investigative stage and at an administrative hearing or a trial, 
	
and “perfectly homogeneous with respect to damage-related variables”; (2) the cases 
are, in fact, so similar, that repeating an analysis of a single case 100 times would 
have substantially the same result if 100 different cases were analyzed; (3) the 
average of sample verdicts “more closely” [approximates] the correct damages figure 
for any case in the population than the verdict from an individual trial of that case; 
and (4) even if the population is not comprised of identical claims, if “the variation is 
not too great and the sample size is large enough,” the outcome is still likely to be 
accurate. Id. at 833–37; Bone, supra note 106, at 578. The likelihood that parties to a 
False Claims Act litigation will be able to determine, with any certitude, that each of 
the claims presented is essentially “identical” is very low; consequently, this 
methodology’s usefulness is correspondingly unlikely. 
175 Richard Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 1477, 1512 (1999). 
176 Id. 
FINAL_VLAHOS 2/14/2017  11:02 PM 
2016] APPLICATION OF STATISTICAL SAMPLING 843 
why the sample size is statistically inadequate.”177  For instance, 
in Michigan Department of Education v. United States 
Department of Education, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit held that a sample size of .4% of the total 
population was acceptable, in contravention of an earlier holding 
in the Middle District of Florida, Daytona Beach General 
Hospital v. Weinberger, where a 10% sample was deemed too 
small to achieve an accurate result.178 
Statistical sampling is therefore an unpredictable and 
unreliable methodology, and so the risk of erroneous deprivation 
is correspondingly high.  This methodology is not a valid means 
to determine the merits of a False Claims Act case. 
2. Statistical Sampling and the De Facto Reduction of the 
Burden of Proof 
Under this second prong of the Mathews v. Eldridge test, it is 
necessary to examine the “sufficiency of the current procedures, 
and the availability of alternative or substitute procedures.”179  
When the burden of proof for False Claims Act cases was reduced 
from the “clear and convincing” evidence standard to the 
“preponderance of the evidence” standard, Frank LaSalle argued 
in The Civil False Claims Act: The Need for a Heightened Burden 
of Proof as a Prerequisite for Forfeiture, that the penalty imposed 
on those who are judged to have violated the False Claims Act is 
“quasi-criminal,” and so defendants are entitled to a more 
strenuous review of the plaintiffs’ allegations than the new 
standard of proof affords them.180  The use of statistical sampling 
reduces the standard of proof even further.181 
	
177 Jack R. Bierig, Note, Methodological Challenges to Government Sampling 
Techniques in Civil Fraud and Abuse Cases, 32 J. HEALTH L. 339 (1999). 
178 Id. The difference in holdings was rationalized by the fact that the defendant 
in the former was “given every opportunity to challenge” the sample size and the 
“technique” by which the sample was evaluated. 
179 LaSalle, supra note 14, at 526. 
180 Id. at 527, 529. 
181 Statistical sampling was deemed permissible for the calculation of damages 
by the United States Supreme Court in 1927 in Eastman Kodak Co. of N.Y. v, S. 
Photo Materials Co., where liability had already been established. 273 U.S. 359, 379 
(1927). In Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co., the Supreme 
Court judged that the proof requirement for liability exceeds the proof requirement 
for damages. 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931). Even in mass tort cases, in order to 
determine liability, the burden of proof is the preponderance of the evidence—a 
different standard than that used to determine damages. Walker, supra note 152, at 
460. 
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Statistical sampling, as a means of evidentiary analysis for 
the purpose of proving liability, is simply insufficient to protect 
defendants’ property interests.  The “more severe the sanction, 
the more procedure must protect against sanctioning of the 
innocent, and . . . the more it must protect the accused’s dignity 
and privacy.”182  In cases where statistical analysis would be used 
to determine defendants’ liability, defendants are vulnerable—
the methodology whereby liability is determined may be, as 
discussed in the previous section, flawed—and defendants are 
denied the opportunity to defend themselves against each 
individual claim of fraud.183  Consequently, the defendants: 
[S]tand to lose a tremendous amount of money, disproportionate 
to the actual harm they caused and potentially their ability to 
participate in government programs. . . . Also, both parties 
involved are not private, but rather the Government is 
prosecuting the case.  When the Government is a party to an 
action, there is an increased risk of error due to the disparity in 
resources and options available to the Government vis a vis the 
defendant.184 
Statistical sampling enables the plaintiffs to bypass individual 
examinations of each claim, and effectively denies defendants the 
opportunity to challenge those claims.  While the plaintiffs 
benefit from doing less work and achieving more favorable 
outcomes, the risk of erroneous deprivation of the defendants’ 
property increases. 
3. Sampling’s Implications for Defendants’ Seventh 
Amendment Rights 
Other process-related concerns regarding statistical 
sampling include what some have described as “[stripping] 
adjudication of . . . its most essential attribute—a trial of factual 
and legal issues in the context of an individual dispute.”185  A 
common argument in opposition to the adoption of statistical 
sampling to determine liability is that statistical sampling 
deprives defendants of their Seventh Amendment right to a trial 
	
182 LaSalle, supra note 14, at 530. 
183 Saks & Blanck, supra note 174, at 838 (“[A]lthough all defendants would 
have an opportunity to present their evidence and arguments, they would not get to 
do so in response to every plaintiff, but only to a sample of them.”). 
184 LaSalle, supra note 14, at 531. 
185 Bone, supra note 106, at 617–18 (quoting In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 
706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990)). 
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by jury.186  Defendants’ rights are abrogated under the Seventh 
Amendment when courts fail to consider individual evidence 
from each claim before the jury.187  In Bigelow v. RKO Radio 
Pictures, Inc., the court held that “the jury may not render a 
verdict based on speculation or guesswork.”188  Instead, as in In 
re Vioxx, a products liability litigation, courts insist that the 
defendants’ Seventh Amendment rights supersede plaintiffs’ 
interest in efficiency.  Courts have declined to apply statistical 
sampling in other litigation contexts, including products liability 
litigation, where judges were unconvinced that the use of 
sampling did not deprive defendants of their Seventh 
Amendment rights.189 
4. Statistical Sampling and Specificity of Pleading 
Requirements 
The use of statistical sampling also circumvents another 
crucial step of the False Claims Act adjudicatory process—or of 
any litigation, for that matter.  To present a cognizable claim, 
under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff 
must present an issue that is supported by enough facts to defeat 
a motion for summary judgment—the facts must be specific 
enough to demonstrate that there is a justiciable issue.190 
Various circuit courts differ as to what degree of specificity 
must be alleged in plaintiffs’ complaints to successfully initiate 
litigation on a False Claims Act claim.  The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure provide, in Rule 8, that a party which submits its 
pleading to the court must include “a short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”191  
Additionally, each allegation should be expressed in a manner 
which is “simple, concise, and direct.”192  Of particular interest is 
the requirement under Rule 9(b)—if fraud or mistake is alleged 
in the pleading, “the circumstances constituting such fraud or 
	
186 Roche, supra note 154, at 1508–09. 
187 Id. 
188 Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946). 
189 Trapani, supra note 102, at 2522. 
190 FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
191 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
192 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d). 
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mistake must be stated with ‘particularity.’ ”193  On the one hand, 
the First Circuit and the Seventh Circuit have held that the 
plaintiffs need not enumerate specific false claims to meet the 
9(b) pleading standard—and so, perhaps, statistical sampling 
would be deemed sufficient at this stage.194  On the other hand, 
the Fifth, Eleventh, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have 
concluded that plaintiffs do need to allege specific false claims.195  
These conflicting holdings challenge those who would offer up 
statistical sampling as an alternative to individually proven and 
argued claims as evidence at trial. 
Still, the requirement of specificity is a mandate that was 
imposed for the purpose of protecting the due process rights of 
the defendants.196  This requirement also protects defendants 
from prosecutors conducting witch-hunts, claiming fraud without 
any factual basis and then fishing around for evidence to support 
that conclusion, after the defendants have already suffered the 
risks that accompany a finding of liability.197  Since courts are 
unable to conclude that statistical sampling presents sufficient 
	
193 Barney J. Finberg, Construction and Application of Provision of Rule 9(b), 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, That Circumstances Constituting Fraud or Mistake 
be Stated with Particularity, 27 AM. L. REP. FED. 407, § 2a (1976). 
194 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 
F.3d 13, 29 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that a relator could satisfy Rule 9(b) by providing 
factual or statistical evidence to strengthen the inference of fraud beyond possibility 
without necessarily providing details as to each claim); United States ex rel. Lusby v. 
Rolls-Royce Corp. 570 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2009). 
195 See, e.g., Hopper v. Solvay Pharms., Inc., 588 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 
2009) (holding that an allegation of fraud under the False Claims Act must meet the 
heightened pleading standard of 9(b), which should be applied and enforced 
predictably and reliably: if “Rule 9(b) is to carry any water, it must mean that an 
essential allegation and circumstance of fraudulent conduct cannot be alleged in 
such conclusory fashion” (quoting United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 
290 F.3d 1301, 1313 (11th Cir. 2002))); Sanderson v. HCA-The Healthcare Co., 447 
F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir. 2006); United States ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence Bluecross 
Blueshield of Utah, 472 F.3d 702, 728 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that complaints 
alleging false claims must be based on facts, and not “speculation and conclusory 
allegations”); United States ex rel. Spicer v. Westbrook, 751 F.3d 354, 365 (5th Cir. 
2014); United States ex rel. Vigil v. Nelnet, Inc., 639 F.3d 791, 796 (8th Cir. 2010). 
196 “To satisfy the particularity requirement in pleading fraud, the pleader must 
set out the time, place, and content of the alleged misrepresentation with 
specificity.” Finberg, supra note 193, ¶ 2a. Furthermore, the defendant requires 
notice so that he: (1) may be able “to prepare meaningful responses”; (2) “to preclude 
the use of a groundless fraud claim as a pretext to discovering a wrong”; and (3) “to 
safeguard defendants from frivolous charges which might damage their 
reputations.” Id. 
197 Id. 
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evidence at the pleadings stage, they surely cannot conclude that 
statistical sampling provides enough factual evidence to justify a 
determination of liability, and the grave consequences a finding 
of liability entails. 
C. Balancing of Interests—Efficiency Versus Due Process Rights 
Under the third prong of the Mathews v. Eldridge test, the 
federal government clearly has a compelling interest in enforcing 
the False Claims Act more vigorously, because it will then be 
able to recover even more wrongfully disbursed federal funds.  
But these ends do not justify using statistical sampling as the 
means.  The requirement of individually pleading each claim is a 
burden the government would be grateful to bypass in the 
interest of efficiency.  Still, the loss risked by defendants if of 
substantial value, such that the defendant ought to be entitled to 
all of the protections of a civil trial’s procedural requirements 
before it is deprived of that value. 
Admittedly, in other contexts, the government’s interests in 
efficiency and expedience have won out over adjudications over 
individual clams.198  In mass tort cases, for example, arriving at a 
settlement occurs through a process akin to sampling—“[b]oth 
procedures extrapolate from a subset of cases to generate 
outcomes for all cases in the larger population.”199  The use of 
statistical sampling has long been promulgated within the 
context of mass tort litigations, because the encumbrance of 
litigating each claim individually, and offering adequate evidence 
for each claim, is so great that plaintiffs are often “preclude[d]” 
from “trying cases.”200  So, too, in class action litigations—in 
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos,201 the Ninth Circuit allowed 
compensatory damages for 9,541 class members to be calculated 
using a random sample of 137 claims, and the court extrapolated 
the validity and value of the sample set to the remaining 
	
198 Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Liability, 85 VA. L. REV. 329, 
343 (1999) (“Individualized information should be used where it is practical—i.e., 
cost effective—to obtain. If individual information is not practical to obtain, however, 
sampling should be used so that a judgment can be reached efficiently and 
expeditiously.”). 
199 Bone, supra note 106, at 574. 
200 Roche, supra note 154, at 1502. 
201 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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claims.202  The court in that case also considered the difficulty of 
adjudicating nearly 10,000 claims individually to determine the 
defendant’s liability and determined that some degree of 
accuracy in the outcome was justifiably sacrificed in the interest 
of efficiently determining the claims’ outcome.203 
Indeed, in the context of such mass litigations, courts are 
now far more accepting of statistical sampling than perhaps ever 
before—statistical sampling is “a well-accepted alternative for 
the trial judge facing crippling discovery and evidentiary 
costs.”204  However, as discussed in the foregoing sections, when 
the competing interests at stake are administrative efficiency on 
the one hand, and protecting defendants’ due process rights on 
the other, as is the case in False Claims Act matters, the latter 
must always prevail. 
CONCLUSION 
Statistical sampling is not an appropriate tool for litigating 
liability in False Claims Act cases.  It deprives defendants of 
their Due Process rights under the Fifth Amendment, by 
depriving them of property without providing them with the 
opportunity to defend themselves against a finding of liability for 
each individual claim alleged.  Statistical sampling enables 
plaintiffs, including qui tam relators and the federal government, 
to circumvent their burden of proof, including the burden of 
providing evidence of each element of a False Claims Act claim. 
Though statistical sampling certainly presents a means of 
saving time and resources for plaintiffs bringing False Claims 
Act cases, and its use would facilitate False Claims Act 
enforcement, and, consequently, the recovery of more assets for 
	
202 Id. at 782–87. The use of sampling in this case was ultimately approved 
because of the caution the plaintiffs exercised in completing their statistical 
analysis—the thousands of claims were divided into smaller groups based on shared 
characteristics, and the analysis was completed across those groups, accounting for 
those differences. Id. at 785. 
203 Id. at 786. 
204 Roche, supra note 154, at 1502. This alternative was adopted for the 
litigation of asbestos-related injuries in Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc., where 
the District Court judge allowed a sample of 160 claims to be analyzed to determine 
the damages to be awarded to each member of a full class of 2,298 claims. 751 F. 
Supp. 649, 653 (E.D. Tex. 1990), rev’d, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998). This technique 
was eventually rejected by the Fifth Circuit, which held that the defendant was 
entitled to a jury trial on each individual claim to determine damages. Id. at 319 
(5th Cir. 1998). 
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the federal government, these benefits should not be provided at 
the expense of defendants’ due process rights under the 
Constitution. 
